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Abstract 
 
Many antiracist theorists allege that antiracism suffers from a crisis of 
being unable to realize its goals and potential. The fact that we 
continue to experience racism in the 21st century and that 
contemporary antiracist movements are fragmented and dispersed 
is upheld as evidence of an antiracist failure. In light of such alleged 
shortcomings, Pierre-André Taguieff invites us to rebuild what he 
calls the “fragile ship” of antiracism, while Paul Gilroy urges us to 
abandon it altogether. Drawing on poststructuralism and the work 
of anarchists engaged in antiracist activism, I argue that the 
proclaimers of an antiracist crisis are unduly influenced by Antonio 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Gramscian influenced antiracism 
dismisses non-unified antiracist movements for being ineffectually 
engaged in, what Michael Omi and Howard Winant characterize 
as, “counterposed strategic orientations.” This paper will briefly 
consider Gramsci’s influence on antiracist theory, with a greater 
focus on Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory. I turn to two 
case studies of antiracist anarchist movements, anarchist 
antifascism and Anarchist People of Color, in order to show that 
rather than being in crisis, antiracism today continues to struggle 
against racism outside of the logic of hegemony. I demonstrate that 
without recourse to such Gramscian “solutions” as political unity and 
intellectual leadership, social movements continue to deal with 
questions of race and racism and to mount significant opposition to 
racial hierarchies. In doing so, they constitute not Taguieff’s fragile 
ship but what I identify as a strategically flexible antiracism. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
If, as Richard Day’s provocatively titled work announces, Gramsci Is Dead (2005) 
then death must by extension also enshroud Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s 
hegemonically-oriented racial formation theory and the various currents of 
antiracist thought that it informs. By orienting itself in poststructuralism, this paper 
aims to displace the Gramscian logic of hegemony in antiracism. I will do so by 
demonstrating that what Day calls the hegemony of hegemony (2005), which 
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refers to “the assumption that effective social change can only be achieved 
simultaneously and en masse, across an entire national or supranational space” 
(8),2 is endemic to antiracist theory at the risk of making it unable to keep up 
with antiracist social movements.  
 
By antiracism, I have in mind actors who view their activism explicitly in terms of 
a principled opposition to racism. Although technically this includes liberal, 
policy-driven, state-based approaches developed by think tanks, commissions, 
councils, and non-profit organizations, preference in this paper will be given to 
radical, street/underground/grassroots-based, and autonomous activist 
collectives. It must be stressed early on that even among this more “focused” 
range of antiracist actors, racism is conceptualized in different ways. The non-
unified, dispersed existence of these social movements invites us to consider that 
racism itself is, as Floya Anthias and Cathy Lloyd characterize it, “a fluid and 
shifting phenomenon which evades clear and absolute definition in a once-
and-for-all type of way” (2002, 8). If racism only came down to fascist street level 
violence of groups like the Ku Klux Klan or Aryan Nations, then antifascism alone 
would suffice as an antiracist response. If racism was just colonialism, then 
Indigenist, Nationalist, and Third World anti-colonial movements would do. If 
racism was only about state control over immigration, migration, and refugee 
flows, anti-border movements, such us No One Is Illegal, would be the answer. 
And if racism boiled down to white supremacy and assimilation, then networks 
like Anarchist People of Color would constitute the right response. The fact is that 
all of these movements are with us right now because racism functions 
according to many logics. The response to racism is, unsurprisingly, as diverse as 
racism itself.  
 
The significant distinction developed here is between counter-hegemonic and 
strategically flexible antiracist movements. The former aspire to bring about as 
much total change as possible, and as such they are much more likely to 
attempt to institute antiracism by working within, what John Holloway describes 
as, “the state paradigm” (2010, 12). The latter bypass this paradigm as they do 
not seek to universalize their aims and do not aim their political projects at 
anything like the complete transformation of the entire range of social relations; 
rather, following the logic of affinity, they are open to diffusion, fragmentation, 
and multiplicity. This paper demonstrates that the hegemony of hegemony has 
established a firm foothold in antiracist theory from where it identifies an impasse 
in antiracist social movements, effectively closing off or dismissing affinity-based 
antiracist projects. The impasse consists of what Omi and Winant call 
“counterposed strategic orientations” (1986, 102) – that is, of the fact that 
antiracist movements employ multiple, even contradictory, approaches in 
combating racism and generally suffer from “splintered political action” (1986, 
102). In light of this “crisis,” Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory prescribes a 
counter-hegemonic solution that calls for antiracist movements to abandon 
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their multiple approaches in favor of a single, unified theoretically-sanctioned 
strategy that would “consolidate a new radical democratic politics with 
majoritarian aspirations” (Omi and Winant 1986, 140). 
 
As such, I read racial formation theory as partaking in the counter-hegemonic 
longing for what Pierre-André Taguieff calls “a certain antiracism that still 
remains to be invented” (2001, 80). This paper takes a contrary position. Rather 
than rethink, like Omi, Winant, and Taguieff, about how to get back to the 
drawing board in order to create an adequate or correct counter-hegemonic 
antiracist theory with which we could direct and shape the movements (a 
project that imagines that it is necessary to go from theory to practice),3  we 
ought to instead entertain the possibility that contemporary antiracist social 
movements – and specifically, affinity based movements – have 
outmaneuvered the drawing board and that what is required is that we pay 
greater attention to already existing social movements as potent reservoirs of 
antiracist theory. To this end, I will map out the strategic orientations of two 
contemporary anarchist antiracist movements, anarchist antifascism and 
Anarchist People of Color. My argument is that these movements bypass the 
hegemony of hegemony in antiracism by productively utilizing two 
contradictory strategies. Employing Taguieff (2001), I argue that antifascist 
anarchists orient their activism according to the strategy of universalism (based 
on an appeal to colorblind ideology), while Anarchist People of Color utilize the 
strategy of differentialism (based on an appeal to race-conscious or 
colourconscious ideology). However, where, along with Omi and Winant, 
antiracist theory identifies a limit of “two antiracisms with contradictory values 
and norms” (Taguieff 2001, 8), I propose to recast antiracist anarchism in terms of 
a strategically flexible antiracism that can only be grasped outside of the logic 
of hegemony.  
 
Gramsci and Antiracism  
 
A suspicion of Gramsci may at first sight seem unwarranted. His work certainly 
makes a number of significant contributions, if not advances, to Marxism and 
continues to play a substantial role in contemporary social movement theory. 
For one, Gramsci’s contribution consists of a theory of history without 
guarantees. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe, we may say that 
Gramsci matters because in his work the “logic of necessity” gives way to “the 
logic of spontaneism” (1985, 12). This is to say, Gramsci abandons the materialist 
inspired laws of historical progression. He dispenses with the holdovers of vulgar 
Marxist history, which see a mechanistic unfolding of history that “does not allow 
for the possibility of error” (Gramsci 1999, 408). In addition, Gramsci complicates 
the dialectical materialist account of the social. His work does not rely on the 
familiar model of the base and superstructure, where the latter strictly functions 
as an ideological defense mechanism of the former; rather, for Gramsci the 
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superstructure itself develops according to its own historical trajectory and 
cannot be seen solely as something generated by economic conditions in the 
defense of those conditions. Politics develops in relationship to economics, but, 
and crucially, “it is also distinct from it” (Gramsci 1999, 140). Rather than seeing 
political parties (a superstructural element) as a “mechanical and passive 
expression of those classes” (Gramsci 1999, 227) whose interests they represent, 
we are offered a view that maintains that parties also “react energetically upon 
them [economic classes] in order to develop, solidify and universalise them” 
(227). Gramsci thus offers us an indeterminate account of history along with a 
relatively autonomous political sphere and civil society that act back on their 
own economic conditions.  
 
With his theory of hegemony, Gramsci effectively challenges the long-standing 
idea in Marxism that contradictions alone assure the direction that history will 
take. In a move that removes economism from Marxism, he plunges political 
action and activism into the uncertain terrain of civil society and culture. Thus, 
not only does Gramsci present history as open and unpredictable, but his work 
also advances a theory of revolution without a pregiven revolutionary subject. 
No longer is the proletariat automatically the privileged agent of historical 
change in the capitalist epoch. Rather than constructing a theory of the agent, 
Gramsci presents us with a theory of the battleground, where the key actor 
emerges out of alliances established in the course of struggle itself. This means 
that the result of political struggles does not inevitably depend, for Gramsci, on 
any relationship between the forces of production and the relations of 
production but is contingent on the relationship between various political actors 
who struggle to achieve the “political articulation of dissimilar elements” (Laclau 
and Mouffe 2001, 60). This is not to deny that capitalism contains certain 
contradictions; it is only to say that the outcome of those contradictions 
ultimately depends on “a strong activity of the will” (Gramsci 1999, 336) of 
political actors who variously form alliances as they seek to liquidate their 
opponents. Finally, it is important to note that to succeed, such alliances must 
attempt to consolidate a large, unified oppositional culture that, in turn, must 
“aim to replace” (Gramsci 1999, 340) the existing hegemony. Every counter-
hegemony is successful to the extent that it becomes hegemonic.    
 
Many social movement and antiracist theorists analyze social movements 
through the prism of Gramscian hegemony and the contours of Gramsci’s 
theory I have just identified. Gayatri Spivak, for example, considers that any 
progressive social movement must face “the difficult task of counterhegemonic 
ideological production” (1988, 275) and that it is the task of theory to identify the 
way in which variously localized and dispersed movements can successfully do 
so. With rampant racism in its various forms – Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, 
systemic racism against people of colour, ongoing colonialism, and the 
reawakening of fascism – we may ask, is antiracism not after all in crisis, or, 
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following Spivak, at least badly in need of counter-hegemonic refurbishing? 
Many sociologists and antiracist theorists have done just that. For them, Gramsci 
holds out the possibility of a unified antiracist theory and a large scale, coherent 
movement that could deal a final blow to hegemonic racism. Gramsci informs 
the work of Cathy Lloyd, who frames the problem by asking, “[h]ow will the 
traditional themes of anti-racism – opposition to racial discrimination, 
representation of and solidarity with people who experience racism, and the 
attempt to establish an anti-racist common sense (or hegemony, in the 
Gramscian sense) – fit into the political discourses of the twenty-first century, 
marked by post-colonialism and globalization?” (2002, 61). Similarly, Himani 
Bannerji poses the problem in a Gramscian frame when she argues that “our 
hegemonic ‘subsumption’ into a racist common sense… can only be prevented 
by creating counter-hegemonic interpretive and organizational frame-works…” 
(2000, 120). Echoing her, Paul Gilroy likewise hopes to overcome inadequate 
antiracist counter-hegemony by appealing to “new bases for solidarity and 
synchronized action” (2001, 111-2, emphasis mine). The problem that is restated 
in this current of antiracism is one of turning dispersed minorities and their various 
movements into effective, which is to say unified, actors who seek to form a 
counter-hegemonic bloc.    
 
For Gramscian inspired antiracist theory, a large diversity of movements presents 
itself as something to be overcome. This is to be accomplished by the active 
reorganization of disparate and unorganized political actors down to a 
manageable common core. It is in the sense of being dissatisfied with a non-
unified diversity of social movement actors that antiracist theory can, in fact, be 
said to suffer from the hegemony of hegemony – that is, of the desire for large 
scale, unanimous, concerted action. As Lloyd observes, “[h]istorically anti-racism 
is associated with movements in support of decolonialisation, anti-fascism and 
struggles against deportation and for immigrants’ rights” (2002, 63).  This, 
however, is not good enough for her; in fact, it indicates a quandary. The desire 
for a common counter-hegemonic core, a large-scale collective refusal of 
racism, reasserts itself when, following this observation, she asks: “What are the 
links between these different aspects and do they make some kind of coherent 
whole which constitutes anti-racism?” (2002, 64). The problem of unity haunts her 
work and Gramscian inspired antiracist theory in general.  
 
We encounter with full-blown vigor this “dilemma” and the proposed counter-
hegemonic solution in the sociology of Omi and Winant. Their magnum opus, 
Racial Formation in the United States (1986), in its third edition as of 2013, 
provides a framework that is enjoying considerable popularity with many 
antiracists. As the editors of the recently published Racial Formation in the 
Twenty-First Century note, “the roots of racial formation continue to develop as 
scholars addressing topics from gender and sexuality to indigeneity and settler 
colonialism, and spanning from literary studies and American studies to 
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sociology, adapt the racial formation framework” (HoSang, LaBennett, and 
Pulido 2012, 19). Given that Omi and Winant draw on Gramsci,4 their work 
introduces the hegemony of hegemony into antiracist theory. Keeping this in 
mind, let us consider in more depth how the direct Gramscian inheritance 
presents itself in their work in terms of a movement-state nexus, the necessity of a 
vanguard, and the identification of a central antagonism. 
 
The Movement-State Nexus 
 
Omi and Winant import Gramsci’s political ontology, which privileges political 
action as occurring within a movement-state nexus. Their theoretical 
conceptualization of the battleground of political action as involving two 
distinct players – social movements and states – is a direct inheritance from 
Gramsci. Reflecting on historical victories, Gramsci notes:  
 
A study of how these innovatory forces developed, from subaltern 
groups to hegemonic and dominant groups, must therefore seek 
out and identify the phases through which they acquired: 1. 
Autonomy vis-à-vis the enemies they had to defeat, and 2. Support 
from the groups which actively or passively assisted them; for this 
entire process was historically necessary before they could unite in 
the form of a State. (1999, 53, emphasis mine) 
 
While he did not explicitly address antiracist movements, any successful counter-
hegemony presupposes, as the above formulation shows, that all movements 
must defeat enemies and create alliances in order to form states and exercise 
hegemony. This is precisely what is involved in a subaltern group becoming 
hegemonic. 
 
The state-movement nexus and the formula of counter-hegemony seeking 
hegemony are firmly in place in Omi and Winant. They explicitly argue that “the 
trajectory of racial politics links… two central actors in the drama of 
contemporary racial politics – the racial state and racially based social 
movements” (Omi and Winant 1986, 82). For Omi and Winant, racial identities, 
racism, and antiracism must in fact be grasped in terms of what they call 
“movement/state relationships” (1986, 176n. 38). This is so because the way we 
see and understand race changes only by virtue of a change in the relationship 
between social movements and the state, as both engage in “political 
contestation over racial meanings” (Omi and Winant 1986, 69, emphasis in 
original). The crucial thing to keep in mind here is that while “social movements 
create collective identity” (Omi and Winant 1986, 83) and “pose new demands 
originating outside state institutions” (Omi and Winant 1986, 84), it is only by 
directing themselves toward the state that such movements can transform the 
racial order. Racial Formation, in fact, designates the historic equilibrium, the 
 
Jakub Burkowicz 
79 
horizon of racial meanings that make up our “common sense” or what we may 
call our common stock of racial knowledge. The racial categories and the 
identities they enable, the kinds of things we “know” about racial others, are all 
established and negotiated by state-movement relations. Racial formation 
theory thus imagines hegemonic common sense as arising primarily from “a 
complex system of compromises” (Omi and Winant 1986, 78) between social 
movements and states.  
 
Besides hinging the social construction of racial identity on hegemonic relations, 
what we are presented with in racial formation theory is a political formula that 
maintains that antiracist movements can only succeed to the extent that they 
capture or merge with state power. Failure is conceptualized by Omi and 
Winant as the failure to penetrate the state, which occurs when “minority 
movements could not be consolidated as a permanent radical democratic 
political force” (1986, 141). We would do well to remember that all this emphasis 
on the state is justified because, for the theory of hegemony, it is the presumed 
primary locus of politics. The state, in other words, is the hub from which an 
antiracist common sense could be elaborated, the centre from which racial 
relations can be rearticulated. Thus, when Omi and Winant argue that “[t]he 
state provides a political framework for interest concertation” (1986, 176n. 39), 
they refer precisely to its capacity, in the Gramscian sense, of universalizing the 
particular perspective of antiracism as the hegemonically articulated common 
sense perspective of civil society itself.  
 
The Vanguard 
 
Having identified the political terrain in terms of the movement-state nexus, the 
theory of hegemony “supposes an intellectual unity” (Gramsci 1999, 333) as a 
necessary component of successful social movements. Intellectual unity has the 
presumed advantage of clarifying the task at hand. Such unity identifies the 
enemy and provides a single, univocal answer to the pressing question, “what is 
to be done?” Where, we might ask, would social movements achieve such 
unity? The answer is from a fundamental group that is made up of organic 
intellectuals who can step in to lead social movements as the “organisers of a 
new culture” (Gramsci 1999, 5). Gramsci is not shy about the elite status of this 
group. He argues that any successful counter-hegemony requires strong 
leadership that would be separate from the masses: 
 
Critical self-consciousness means, historically and politically, the 
creation of an élite of intellectuals. A human mass does not 
“distinguish” itself, does not become independent in its own right 
without, in the widest sense, organising itself; and there is no 
organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and 
leaders, in other words, without the theoretical aspect of the theory-
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practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence of a 
group of people “specialised” in conceptual and philosophical 
elaboration of ideas. (Gramsci 1999, 334)  
 
Gramsci, as such, envisions political struggle taking place on the terrain of 
culture where an intellectual vanguard, the movements it leads, and the state 
with which they clash for supremacy, are the vital components of the theory of 
hegemony.  
 
Incorporating this, Omi and Winant presuppose that “[r]acial movements come 
into being as the result of political projects, political interventions led by 
‘intellectuals’” (Omi and Winant 1986, 80). In the Gramscian tradition of 
championing organic intellectuals, they open the category of the intellectual to 
include such actors as “religious leaders, entertainers, schoolteachers” (1986, 
173 n.11), along with presumably professional intellectuals like Omi and Winant. 
The assumption in their work is that leaders are clearly needed for what racial 
formation theory calls the “rearticulation” of racial meanings: 
 
Rearticulation is a practice of discursive reorganization or 
reinterpretation of ideological themes and interests already present 
in the subjects’ consciousness, such that these elements obtain new 
meaning or coherence. This practice is ordinarily the work of 
“intellectuals.” Those whose role is to interpret the social world for 
given subjects… may on this account be “intellectuals.” (Omi and 
Winant 1986, 173n. 11, emphasis in original)  
 
The intellectuals are mandated by racial formation theory with the task of 
finding and formulating the coherent whole of the antiracist movement in order 
to be able to lead and manage it. Their separation from the masses and 
assigned task of cultural rearticulation is in Omi and Winant true to Gramscian 
form.  
 
The Central Antagonism  
 
Despite developing an indeterminate theory of social change, for Gramsci the 
economy remains the most important site of conflict. Like a good Marxist, he 
never abandons the presupposition of a central economic contradiction or the 
base and superstructure model; rather, Gramsci introduces the terrain of culture 
and civil society in relationship to the economic base. The former may well be 
read according to the Althusserian logic of being determined “in the last 
instance” by the latter, which plays the role of what Peyman Vahabzadeh calls 
ultimate referentiality – “a presumed ultimate ground” that is said to manifest 
itself socially and from which in-turn we claim to derive our knowledge of the 
social (2009, 458). The economic base, in other words, is the “point of ultimacy… 
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that justifies an entire theoretical approach” (Vahabzadeh 2009, 458) we call 
Marxism, just as one might regard patriarchy as the point of ultimacy for radical 
feminism or the psyche as a point of ultimacy for psychoanalysis.  
 
Omi and Winant, similarly, conceive of a central antagonism upon which they 
pivot social movements and the vanguard. The Gramscian import here is 
oblique, however, as the economy no longer occupies the central place, as it 
does in Marxist theory; only the idea of a central antagonism is retained. Omi 
and Winant abandon the economic base as a central antagonism while 
preserving all the other basic features of Gramsci’s theory. Thus, we have 
Gramsci’s frame without, specifically, Gramsci’s Marxism,5 or it could be said 
that we still have ultimate referentiality but with a shift in the grounds of ultimacy.    
 
The political universe of Omi and Winant posits race as ultimate referentiality. For 
them, race serves as a fundamental, deterministic category. As they boldly 
proclaim, “[c]rucial to this formulation is the treatment of race as a central axis 
of social relations which cannot be subsumed under or reduced to some 
broader category or conception” (Omi and Winant 1986, 61-2, emphasis in 
original). Furthermore, for Omi and Winant, race “suffuses” (1986, 90) social 
relations and “pervade[s] US society, extending from the shaping of individual 
racial identities to the structuring of collective political action on the terrain of 
the state” (1986, 66). Omi and Winant thus, to draw on Todd May, produce an 
image of the “world as a set of concentric circles, with the core or base 
problematic lying at the centre” (1994, 10). All major problems can be reduced 
to the privileged ultimate ground of race that in their theory is conceptualized 
“as a fundamental organizing principle of social relations” (Omi and Winant 
1986, 66, emphasis in original). Placing all their bets on the ahistoric structuralist 
horse of foundationalism, they announce that “[r]ace will always be at the 
center of the American experience” (Omi and Winant 1986, 6, emphasis in 
original), and, in what amounts to sidestepping the particular national histories 
of various nation-states, that “[e]very state institution is a racial institution” (Omi 
and Winant 1986, 76).  
 
All the elements discussed are, of course, interrelated, and it was only for the 
sake of conceptual clarity that I separate them. The theory of hegemony tells us 
that what really matters is a complete transformation of the entire social 
structure on the basis of a central antagonism. Given that there is a central 
antagonism in the form of racism,6 a vanguard of organic intellectuals are, as 
May puts it, “peculiarly well placed to analyze and to lead the resistance” (1994, 
11). Success in this formulation can only be achieved when the vanguard leads 
the social movements in capturing or modifying state power. The theory of 
hegemony is thus offered as the solution to the crisis of fragmented, leaderless 
movements that, as I will show next, are strategically held to be at odds.  
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Toward a Strategically Flexible Antiracism 
 
The hegemony of hegemony looms large in Omi and Winant. While their work 
has the advantage of offering a coherent and tightly bound theory of, and for, 
antiracist social movements, it runs against a number of severe limits that a 
poststructural critique makes clear. As Day argues, the theory of hegemony 
imagines that only large-scale social change is effective, that the goal is one “of 
a final event of totalizing change” (2005, 9). The limit here is that in privileging this 
goal, the hegemony of hegemony blocks alternative interpretations of antiracist 
social movements that dispense with vanguards; that refuse to see race/racism 
as a fundamental, central antagonism; and that do not measure success in 
terms of the capacity for movements to penetrate the state. All of this is to say 
that racial formation theory allows us to think of movements only in terms of their 
capacity for counter-hegemony. It evaluates them according to this counter-
hegemonic standard. In so doing, it subsumes social movements to the state, 
potentially bureaucratizing the former. Operating under the hegemony of 
hegemony, racial formation theory cannot account for social movements 
outside of the trajectory it proscribes for them: “Racially based political 
movement as we know them are inconceivable without the racial state” (Omi 
and Winant 1986, 80). Racial formation theory thus inhibits our ability to think of 
antiracist social movements according to a more suitable non-hegemonic logic 
– a logic that Day designates as the affinity for affinity (2009), which denotes 
“non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, non-coercive relationships based on 
mutual aid and shared ethical commitments” (8). In short, racial formation 
theory only accounts for counter-hegemonic radical social movements, while 
dismissing and ignoring non-hegemonic forms of antiracism.  
 
Furthermore, by conceiving the terrain of resistance in terms of hegemony, 
racial formation theory runs the risk of legitimizing only one type of antiracist 
strategy, variously ignoring or dismissing the complexity of strategies already in 
use. Omi and Winant impose such a limit to the extent that they identify as the 
goal an antiracism that utilizes the concept of race to wrest concessions on 
behalf of racial minorities. Reflecting on past social movements, Omi and 
Winant observe that the Civil Rights movement was limited initially by seeking 
“black integration” (1986, 19) premised on “rhetoric [that] often explicitly 
appealed to the ideal of a ‘race-free’ society” (1986, 92), whereas they regard 
“[t]he real accomplishment of cultural nationalist currents… in unifying and 
promoting collective identity among the oppressed” (1986, 44). Omi and 
Winant, as such, deny post-racial society as a goal and privilege the 
differentialist antiracist use of racial identity. As they openly state, “[t]he central 
argument of this work… cannot be addressed by ‘colorblind’ theory or policy” 
(1986, 143). Taguieff, as a counterexample, takes the opposite side in favor of a 
colourblind, race-free society. He identifies the antiracist goal as one of 
“clear[ing] the horizon of the opiated fumes exhaled by the fetishism of 
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difference” (Taguieff 2001, 310). It is important to note that just like Omi and 
Winant, Taguieff also operates under the hegemony of hegemony in that his 
work blasts the triumphant tones of a wide-reaching global antiracism. However, 
unlike Omi and Winant, who see racial identity simply as “difference” or 
“community,” Taguieff identifies it as a handmaiden to cultural nationalism and 
to the “the reign of pure violence” of 20th century totalitarian systems (2001, 
306). To get away from racial classification, which for him is in itself problematic, 
he proposes a rethinking of “founding universalism, which forms the basis of an 
effective antiracist position” (Taguieff 2001, 305). Taguieff thus advocates 
universalist antiracist strategy as the strategy, while Omi and Winant promote 
differentialist antiracism.  
 
The above-mentioned theorists are not alone. Many antiracists operate under 
the shadow of Gramscian hegemony and engage in the fatal business of 
choosing the absolute best strategy for antiracism. Echoing Taguieff, Gilroy 
claims universalist antiracism as the clear choice of strategy when he argues 
that “action against racial hierarchies can proceed more effectively when it has 
been purged of any lingering respect for the idea of ‘race’ ” (2001, 13). 
Assuming the stance of the intellectual qua the vanguard, he stresses that 
marginalized “groups will need to be persuaded very carefully that there is 
something worthwhile to be gained from a deliberate renunciation of ‘race’ as 
the basis for belonging to one another and acting in concert” (Gilroy 2001, 12). 
The hegemonic commitment to universalist strategy becomes evident when 
antiracists reject the race concept as “an intellectual error” and conclude that 
“enabling people to express their own racial identity and to be accorded 
equality, and rights, as races is problematic” (Bonnett 2000, 7, emphasis in 
original) or when they, in the same vein, argue that “the most significant… social 
movements have undermined the viability of the concept of ‘race’ ” (Farrar 
2004, 219).  
 
At its core, universalist antiracism eschews racial categories and identities on the 
grounds that these are the tools with which racists carve up and establish racial 
hierarchies. For Taguieff, Gilroy, Bonnett, and Farrar, all racism begins with a 
fundamental, essential difference that is attributed as a “natural” property of 
the social construct we call race. To be sure, their position is certainly informed 
by the history of racism. Take, for example, 19th century scientific racism which 
employed anthropology, anthropometry, craniometry, and other disciplines, in 
order to construct typologies that supported the classification of human 
populations into physically discrete human types. We could say that simply 
differentiating people into various racially defined categories (white, Asian, 
black, Indigenous, etc.) is an invitation to racism. Judging from racist social 
movements such as Eugenics, and apartheid states such as pre-Mandela South 
Africa or Jim Crow era United States, it appears that race is the currency of 
racism, and it follows that any use of racial identity only lands us deeper into 
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peril. Racial identity, as the lifeblood of various racist movements and states, 
compromises any antiracism that bases itself on it. For this universalist antiracism, 
resistance to racism must, therefore, aim at humanist, colourblind, and post-
racial horizons.  
 
On the other side of the antiracist divide we may observe an unwavering 
commitment to differentialism. This current of antiracism often manifests itself in 
arguments for the retention of essentialist markers of difference (variously in the 
defense of “particularity” or “diversity”). To be sure, differentialist strategy does 
not naively uphold racial identity as a biological essence or as something that 
occurs naturally. As Agnes Calliste and George J. Sefa Dei carefully note, “we 
operationalize the race concept as a social-relational category defined by 
socially selected real or imagined physical, as well as cultural, characteristics” 
(2000, 20-1). Differentialist strategy recognizes that even as a social-relational 
category race essentializes; however, for differentialist antiracism “the risk of 
essence” (Spivak 1993, 3) is worth taking since racism can only, or best, be 
overcome when “political movements mobilize around particular forms of 
identity” (Calliste and Dei 2000, 28). Such an “oppositional political project differs 
from… post-racial perspectives” (St. Louis 2002, 652) of universalist antiracists in 
that it regards “race… [as] a conceptual abstraction with material effects” (St. 
Louis 2002, 666, emphasis in original). It follows here that given the real social 
effects (i.e. racism) of what is admittedly a social construct (i.e. race), we are 
compelled to utilize, or at least recognize, racial identity. This current of 
antiracism takes the social construction of race seriously enough that it is 
unwilling to part with race solely on the grounds that it is a scientifically invalid 
concept. Most of the theorists that I have grouped under the differentialist 
banner share a suspicion around the easy dismissal of race precisely on the 
grounds that even as alleged “fictions,” racial identities function. Others 
question the necessary racial privilege involved in being able to sidestep racial 
identity altogether (Gallagher 2003).  
 
Here too we encounter historic grounds for asserting identity, for retaining it as 
an antiracist resource, and for demanding the recognition of difference. While 
examples like scientific racism, Eugenics, and apartheid may readily spring to 
mind when we consider the history of racism, we would also do well, as this 
current of antiracism reminds us, to consider that racism also operates by 
absorbing, including, incorporating, and assimilating difference – in short, by 
speaking the humanist, colourblind language of universalism. What used to be 
called “Canadianization” operated precisely according to this dimension of 
racism in Canada. Duncan Scott Campbell, the Canadian Deputy Minister in 
charge of Indian Affairs from 1913 to 1932, demonstrated this logic when he 
stated that the goal of residential schools was “to kill the Indian in the child” (in 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2012, 81). Residential schools 
were, according to Campbell to “continue until there is not a single Indian in 
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Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic, and there is no 
Indian question, and no Indian Department” (in Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada 2012, 12). Today’s settler states abide by the logic of 
universalist racism in adhering to the ideology of meritocracy and in upholding 
what sociologists call “systemic racism.”7 Unlike differentialist racism, which 
wants to know the other in order to distance the other, universalist racism wants 
to know the other in order to erase the problematic signs of their otherness. 
Universalist racism entertains the fantasy of removing the particular, 
communitarian markers of Indigeneity and, as Campbell illustrates, violently 
recoding them with markers of an undifferentiated Canadian sameness. Given 
such forms of racism, the counter-hegemonic commitment to differentialist 
antiracist strategy, thus, objects in principle “to the use of universal groupings” 
(Mohanty 2003, 25) that would subsume difference under a colourblind, post-
racial humanism. Instead, it argues for particular racial identity as “as a source of 
knowledge and a basis for progressive mobilization” (Mohanty 2003, 6).  
 
As I have shown, many antiracist theorists who ground themselves in the 
hegemony of hegemony can be placed along differentialist or universalist 
strategies from where they contest racism while unduly regarding other 
antiracists with suspicion. My argument is that the choosing of an absolute 
antiracist aim on the basis of a single antiracist strategy makes sense only within 
the terms of hegemony itself. After all, if the central antagonism is presumed to 
be universalist racism (a racism that ignores differences and aims to integrate 
everyone into a white, but “colourblind,” society), it makes perfect sense to 
propose that movements can only succeed to the extent that they articulate 
differentialist antiracist aims. To get there it follows that a vanguard is needed to 
step in and correct the poor analysis of existing movements, to unify fragmented 
movements, and lead them in struggle against a state. If, on the other hand, the 
central antagonism is presumed to be differentialist racism (a racism that stresses 
racial difference, creates racial identities, and aims to segregate/exterminate 
racial minorities), the same requirements, in terms of a vanguard and 
engagement with the state, remain in place. My goal, however, is not to argue 
which strategy is ultimately the correct one but to show that both strategies, 
when stripped of the hegemony of hegemony, have their place in confronting 
the various manifestations and symptoms of racism. If we allow that both types 
of racism can coexist – that states, corporations and other hierarchical 
institutions and practices, variously embody colourblind and colourconscious 
racial ideologies – it follows that the choice of strategy ultimately depends on 
context or on the nature of the racism one is contesting in one’s particular 
location. I am here thus in agreement with Spivak8 that “strategy suits a situation; 
a strategy is not a theory” (1993, 4). The choice of antiracist strategy must be 
made by movements themselves as they adapt themselves to diverse 
circumstances; it does not lie in any kind of hegemonically oriented theory we 
may wish for vanguards to impose on social movements. 
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At this point it becomes necessary to account for strategic flexibility. What 
exactly is meant by strategy itself, and how is it different from tactics? Let us 
tease out the difference by way of considering what contemporary social 
movements mean by the curious phrase “diversity of tactics.” The concept 
designates a value among social movement actors. By it, they hint at an open 
attitude toward the various tactics that actors use in pursuit of social justice. 
From peaceful assemblies that involve the waving of banners, displaying of 
signs, and chanting of slogans; to militant barricades that involve black bloc 
confrontations with state and corporate power; to the subverting of 
advertisement, which clutters urban landscapes; to the construction of 
community centres and cooperatives, the diversity of tactics approach opposes 
the preferential, hierarchical ranking of any of these means of resistance. In the 
toolbox of the activist bricoleur, we find a vast range and combination of such 
tactics – that is, of means for disrupting and resisting various forms of oppression. 
Strategy, on the other hand, designates the mode by which such means are 
arrived at.  
 
I mean by strategy something along the lines of what Michel Foucault means by 
discourse, what Tomas Kuhn means by paradigm, and what Karl Mannheim 
means by ideology. I propose that a strategy is an organizing framework that 
fixes the boundaries of perception and logic toward a certain goal. A strategy is 
always oriented toward a goal, and it presents us with an overall aim by 
delimiting the frontiers of intelligibility with that aim in mind. A strategy, strictly 
speaking, is not a discourse, as it does not join power and knowledge in order to 
construct subjects (Foucault 2003); nor is it a paradigm, as it does not provide a 
model for a coherent scientific tradition (Kuhn 1996); nor is it ideology, as it does 
not designate the underlying political motives and social interests of actors, 
parties, and movements (Mannheim [1936] 1985). A strategy, however, traverses 
them all. A strategy is possible only as discourse, or only within a certain type of 
discursive formation, and a strategy is also a model (in a loose unscientific sense) 
that like ideology articulates and contains underlying motives and interest, but it 
is not any one of these things alone. Rather, a strategy “involves a unitary 
analysis” (May 1994, 10)9 that delineates the possible range of tactics toward a 
predefined aim. Thus, when I argue for a strategically flexible antiracism, this is 
not the same thing as arguing for a diversity of tactics. It is instead an argument 
in favor of a wider range of frameworks from which tactics are elaborated and 
from which they receive their tenor. Lastly, drawing on Jacques Derrida, strategy 
in strategically flexible antiracism is non-teleological; it orients tactics only as a 
“strategy without finality” (1982:7). In this sense it is compatible only with the non-
hegemonic affinity-based principles that characterize contemporary anarchist 
antiracist movements. As I will show in the next section, these movements, in 
renouncing hegemony as a goal, renounce finality. They do not chase 19th 
century chimeras such as freedom, emancipation, and revolution. Without 
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aiming for the complete, total institution of a new world, they work for the 
radical transformation of the relations in which they find themselves, knowing 
that all that is possible is a transformation that will land them into new 
arrangements of power. As such, they are engaged in the potentially endless 
task of challenging and undoing racism, wherever and in whatever form it may 
arrive.  
 
Given this, a strategically flexible antiracism defends what Omi and Winant 
identify (if only in passing) as the problem of “counterposed strategic 
orientations.” Where the hegemony of hegemony privileges only either 
universalist or differentialist approaches because it recognizes only a single 
racial antagonism, a strategically flexible antiracism is open to a deeper 
complexity, to the bewildering possibility that racism itself functions according to 
contradictory strategies and that any contest with it will necessarily embody 
contradiction. Following poststructural analysis of the social as “a borderless 
realm of competing and overlapping organization schemes” (Dumont 2008, 18) 
implies that we recognize the strategic flexibility of racism itself and refuse the 
reductive interpretation, popular today, of racism solely as a strategy of 
colorblindness or colourconsciousness. Poststructuralism demands that we 
abandon the idea of racism as a single structure that can be overcome when 
we locate its “centre” with recourse to ultimate referentiality. What the plethora 
of non-unified and non-totalizing antiracist movements designates is not a crisis 
of a lacking antiracist core but the fact that racism is too complicated to be 
reduced to a single, central antagonism. In the face of multiple modalities of 
racism, contemporary affinity-based antiracist movements must be 
approached, to draw on Foucault’s insights on power, as “a plurality of 
resistances” (1990, 96). The single choice of strategy, therefore, has to be 
rejected along with the absolute foundationalist grounds that it is predicated 
on. With Franklin Adler, strategically flexible antiracism identifies a “false 
choice… between the particularism of the one side versus the universalism of 
the other” (1999, 493). It also cannot help but reject the preference, 
characteristic of the hegemony of hegemony, for strong leaders and intellectual 
elites. I next turn to case studies of anarchist antifascism and Anarchist People of 
Color in order to demonstrate how such movements exercise affinity and 
strategic flexibility, thus bypassing the hegemony of hegemony in antiracism.  
 
Anarchist Antifascism as Universalist Strategy  
 
Anarchist antifascist collectives confront groups that identify themselves as white 
supremacist, fascist, nationalist, or racist. Drawing on a rich history of antifascist 
resistance during World War II, antifascism designates the activism of North 
American and European groups such as Anti-Racist Action, Anti-Fascist Action, 
Arm the Spirit, Antifa, and Red Action. These groups operate on a consensus or 
affinity model in that they are decentralized and leaderless, and they bypass 
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the state as they directly engage in antifascist action. Contemporary anarchist 
antifascists employ a tactic that activist K. Bullstreet calls a “physical-force 
policy” (2001, 3). This entails physical confrontations that sometimes result in 
hand-to-hand fighting with fascists in the streets. Antifascist groups may 
therefore show up to rallies, convergences, and other functions of fascist 
movements in order to disrupt them. As one of Anti-Racist Action’s “points of 
unity” announces, “[w]e go where they go: Whenever fascists are organizing or 
active in public, we’re there. We don’t believe in ignoring them or staying away 
from them. Never let the nazis have the street!” (South Side Chicago Anti-Racist 
Action 2010, 1). The goal of confronting fascism extends to preventing fascism 
from developing. As Bullstreet reasons, “[b]y crushing the fascists at an early 
stage I think it is reasonable to assume that Anti-Fascist Action (AFA) has 
prevented numerous racist attacks and even saved lives. For if the fascists were 
given the chance to freely march, sell their papers, and appear as a 
respectable political force they would just grow and grow” (2001, 1).  
 
Antifascist movements may, as such, be thought of as counter-movements. Their 
goal is to dismantle already existing movements before these grow and seize 
the state. It should be pointed out that antifascist activists are aware that, as 
activist Larry Gambone states, “there is no sort of fascist virus hovering about in 
contemporary society” (2000, 18) that would see white supremacist groups like 
the Aryan Nations or the World Church of the Creator seizing state power 
anytime soon; nonetheless, anarchist antifascists are also aware that fascism 
emerges out of the same circumstances that engender progressive social 
movements. It is to the prevention of such a fascist emergence that they 
dedicate themselves. One could say that they have taken to heart Walter 
Benjamin’s observation that “[b]ehind every fascism, there is a failed revolution” 
(quoted in Fabry 2012, 39) and that it is the failure of their own movement, and 
of the Left in general, that will allow fascism to succeed.  
  
For anarchist antifascists, the confrontation with fascism is not solely physical. A 
considerable amount of their work involves analyzing fascism and prefiguring an 
antifascist culture. Aside from putting on concerts, visiting local schools to give 
presentations, and distributing flyers at community events, antifascist activists 
publish numerous pieces that detail the dimensions of their struggles and offer 
insight into contemporary forms of fascism. Such analyses are not elaborated by 
organic intellectuals, party members, or any of the other figures associated with 
counter-hegemonic movements; they are the work of countless activists 
themselves who participate on the ground and in front of the computer screen. 
Antifascists articulate their views in pamphlets, discussion documents, and 
internet websites, which emerge as participants reflect on their activism. As one 
series of documents states, stressing the unending nature of analyzing and 
contesting fascism, “[t]he essays presented here should be taken as part of an 
ongoing, evolving talk within the movement” (Xtn 2002, 1). Judging from the 
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large quantity of such documents, it can be said that rather than needing 
intellectual guidance, the movements themselves act as their own intellectuals. 
Seeking neither to take over/get concessions from state power, nor to lead/unify 
other movements under a broader antifascist umbrella, anarchist antifascism 
requires no intellectual elite to lead the cadre. 
 
In terms of strategy, antifascist analyses occupy the space of universalist 
antiracism. The consensus here is that fascism is a racism that is driven by the 
need to categorize and hierarchically rank human beings along biologically 
defined scales of difference. As the activist Don Hamerquist argues, “[t]he 
physical and social separation of people along racial and ethnic lines is crucial 
to the fascist worldview” (2002, 62). From his perspective, racism is a deeply 
divisive practice. It requires the construction of racial categories and our 
participation in a worldview that maintains that races really do exist. In opposing 
such a formulation of racism, antifascists understandably adopt a humanist, and 
even colourblind, perspective. As one pamphlet by a group called Anti-Fascist 
Forum puts it: “We are acting as citizens to rebuild the ideological and 
philosophical basis for the liberation of humanity across all borders” (2000, np). In 
the face of the fascist belief in the “incompatibility of races,” the group Anti-
Racist Action reacts by upholding a colourblind position: “There is only one 
‘race’ – the human race” (ARA Network 2004). Such a strategy extends to the 
organizational dynamics and tactics of anarchist antifascist groups, which 
downplay racial distinctions and present themselves as “multi-racial” crews in 
composition (The Anti-Racist Action Network 2009). 
 
While the opposition to fascism might form what we could call the “centre” of 
this current of activism, and while anarchist antifascism operates according to 
what I identify as universalist antiracist strategy, antifascist activists understand 
that the struggle against racism must take place along many axes of 
oppression. That is, anarchist antifascism does not treat racism as a central 
antagonism. As Xtn of Chicago Anti-Racist Action explains, “[t]aking the fight to 
fascism – whether in its white supremacist form, in a crypto-fascist fundamentalist 
variety or perhaps even in forms we have yet to see – cannot be sidelined for 
the larger struggles, or vice versa” (2002, 13). Xtn thus establishes that antifascism 
should not be dismissed by radical social movements for “diverting energy away 
from anti-capitalist struggle” (Xtn 2002, 9) and neither should other struggles be 
seen as less important by antifascists. Rejecting the centrality of any form of 
oppression, but specifically of economic oppression as the central oppression 
from which racism derives, antifascist activists see their work as addressing the 
need “to develop a more complex analysis and, to be blunt, dump workerist 
notions that there exists a united proletariat against the bosses” (Xtn 2002, 10). In 
fact, antifascism is premised on an intersectional and interlocking sensibility that 
displays an affinity for a non-unified plurality of struggles. Neither class nor race 
are treated by antifascist activists as central axes of social relations, and fascism 
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is not considered the only form of racial oppression worth contesting. As the 
activist Hamerquist observes, “[w]e can’t allow a concrete opposition to the 
entire range of oppression, national, sexual, and gender… to be subsumed into 
a generalized and abstract opposition to a common enemy…” (2002, 63, 
emphasis mine). Such an orientation, as these activist voices show, removes the 
need for a single, overarching antiracist approach in favor of strategic flexibility.   
 
Anarchist People of Color as Differentialist Strategy  
 
Anarchist People of Color (henceforth APOC) is not a single group, but a 
collectivity “created to address issues of race, anti-authoritiarianism [sic], and 
people of color struggle politics [sic] within the context of anarchism, and to 
create/increase political safe spaces for people of color” (Anarchist People of 
Color n.d.). What started as an email list in 2001 by activist Ernesto Aguilar grew 
in the U.S. into “a loosely organized network of individuals, collectives, and cells” 
(Anarchist People of Color n.d.). The name APOC, as such, can designate “an 
individual identity, and a movement. Anyone who is such can claim the 
acronym apoc” (People of Color Organize! 2011).  
 
Just like anarchist antifascism, APOC is best described in terms of the affinity for 
affinity. APOC eschews centralization in favor of direct action tactics, which 
seek neither state power nor to negotiate with it. Direct action marks the 
preference of APOC to take things into their own hands as they disrupt the flows 
of state and corporate power and confront racism in its various manifestations. 
For some APOC, this means standing in solidarity with immigrant workers who are 
denied services or threatened with further loss of status; for others, it implies 
opposing racial profiling by the police. The loose organizational structure of 
APOC means that it can extend like a rhizomatic network into other movements. 
We can account for this by considering that APOC emerged as discontent 
mounted over the antiracist approach of the anarchist group Bring the Ruckus. 
For former members Heather Ajani and Ernesto Aguilar, Bring the Ruckus made 
their antiracism too dependent on “the participation of white folks, and… 
[refused] to consider the reality people of color worldwide already understand: 
masses of whites won’t give up their privileges” (2004). Dissatisfied with the way 
in which Bring the Ruckus made the struggle against racism contingent on the 
abolishment of whiteness, APOC splintered away; it did so not as a single group, 
but as a tendency in anarchism itself.    
 
Unlike anarchist antifascism, APOC demonstrates that racism can also be 
challenged by a differentialist antiracism. To this end, APOC utilizes a highly 
colourconscious logic – a logic that makes appeals to, rather than downplaying, 
identity and difference. “There is only one human race” is not a useful rhetorical 
tactic for APOC. This is because for APOC racism is not only about labeling and 
dividing people; racism also assumes a liberal-democratic, colourblind tone that 
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neglects “institutionalized, systematic, and historical oppression” of racial 
minorities (People of Color Organize! 2012). We can therefore say that APOC 
opposes not divisive but unifying practices of racism, which variously seek 
integration and assimilation. Its focus is not so much on fascist and nationalist 
inspired racism as it is on the racism which operates without any easily 
identifiable racists. I have in mind the racism which marginalizes non-whites in 
subtle, indirect, and covert ways as it includes them in corporate hierarchies, 
government bureaucracies, and, even, social movements. It makes sense, as 
such, that given that there is a racism which pretends not to be racist, or stated 
differently, that there is a racism which can be experienced without being easily 
seen, the experiences of people of colour are valued by APOC.  
 
Without recourse to a vanguard and in line with differentialist strategy, APOC 
draws on what the activist freelark describes as “the epistemic privilege of the 
oppressed” (2010). That is, APOC privileges “the unique knowledge that an 
oppressed group has” (freelark 2010) of its own racial subordination. Just as 
women may recognize the day-to-day experience of sexism, and gays and 
lesbians have firsthand understanding of homophobia, APOC maintains that 
people of colour have insights to offer about the everyday, inner-workings of 
racism. Accordingly, APOC websites and documents are rich in firsthand 
accounts about what it is like to be a person of colour in a white supremacist 
society. The differentialist antiracism of APOC implies that identity, even if 
created by racial discourse, cannot be simply dismissed as a social construct 
(Law 2010). Instead, racial identity, which operates in a racialized world, is the 
basis from which radical politics can be elaborated, especially against 
universalist racism.     
 
As Aguilar observes, “the anarchist movement is a long way from being 
egalitarian” (2003). From my reading, some of the most progressive work 
performed by APOC involves challenging racism within the anarchist movement 
itself. Drawing on the epistemic privilege of the oppressed, APOC present a 
serious challenge to anarchist organizing that goes beyond simply noting that 
the movement is dominated by white people or that anarchism places 
whiteness (even as the thing to be abolished!) at the centre of antiracist 
projects. To this end, APOC has developed micropolitical critiques of the 
relations of oppression as they play out within the organizational dynamics of 
radical social movements. In doing so, APOC can be seen to be providing 
“specific analyses of concrete situations of oppression” (May 2011, 41). Many 
APOC activists have noted, as activist Bridget Todd observes, that racism within 
social movements “exists as a kind of pathological denial of the privilege in 
which white progressive activists are actively rooted” (2011). Self-identified white 
antiracist activists perpetuate white privilege, as APOC analyses indicate, by 
“fetish[izing] people of color struggles” (People of Color Organize! 2011); 
tokenizing people of colour by asking them to join movements in order to make 
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them more diverse (freelark 2010); expecting to be educated by people of 
colour on racism while reveling in white guilt (Toi 2012) and acting on behalf of 
people of colour without obtaining their consent (People of Color Organize! 
2011). All of this points to the fact that anarchist movements replicate the very 
structures of oppression they seek to contest, and that “favoritism toward 
whites” within social movements (Olson 2012, 50) needs to be contested. To be 
sure, APOC have challenged white privilege in such movements as Occupy, 
Bring the Ruckus, Love and Rage, and CrimethInc. When anarchist groups are 
confronted by the fact that “many people of color do not feel comfortable in 
almost all-white spaces” (Law 2010), the reactions, as APOC literature attests to, 
range from discomfort and the eventual shifting of topics towards class 
oppression (freelark 2010); to the denial that “anything can be done about POC 
members feeling unsafe” (Toi 2012), or that white activists are responsible for 
colonialism (People of Color Organize! 2011); to even outrage at what white 
anarchists perceive as “divisiveness” (Olson 2012, 50) and “reverse racism” (Toi 
2012) within the movement.  
 
While “Euro-centric anarchism” (People of Color Organize! 2011) seems to be 
alive and well, we would do well to end the discussion by noting two promising 
developments. The first is the emergence of a body of knowledge which, as a 
result of the work of groups like APOC, provides much needed information on 
racism and white privilege within the anarchist movement. Although, APOC 
literature indicates that white anarchists still have a long way to go, we at least 
have a starting point for how to act in solidarity – that is, for how white and non-
white anarchists can work together. It seems the starting point is the willingness 
to recognize the structural privileges of whiteness. Being able to see that 
whiteness implies that whites cannot not be racist (at least not while residing in 
European and white settler societies) is the precondition for further developing 
anarchist relations across the colour line. The second positive development 
consists of the very fact that APOC emerged. Historically, such a group 
designates a new phenomenon on the anarchist scene, creating openings for 
others like it. With its emergence we finally witnessed APOC conferences and 
other events organized as “people of color only” spaces, as well as the much 
needed continuation of resistance against colourblind racism within, and 
outside of, the anarchist movement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The antiracist anarchist movements that I have identified here – anarchist 
antifascism and Anarchist People of Color – are indicative of a displacement of 
the hegemony of hegemony. Along with poststructural theory, they reveal a 
way out of Gramscian-inspired antiracism by challenging the idea that racism is 
the fundamental problem or that there is only one kind of racism; that 
intellectual vanguards with well-developed analyses are needed to lead social 
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movements; and that the state is the most important site for the contestation of 
racism itself. In their affinity based prefigurative practices, anarchist antiracist 
movements show us that resistance to racism can be carried out according to a 
number of strategies. Affinity in antiracism, as I have shown, is thus best 
conceptualized in terms of strategic flexibility. Utilizing what, following Taguieff, I 
identify as universalist strategy, antifascist anarchist groups oppose 
colourconscious racist practices, while along the lines of differentialist strategy, 
APOC brings attention to colourblind racist practices. Both movements, as such, 
can be seen as operating on the basis of a strategically flexible antiracism that 
refuses to privilege either strategy as the strategy.  
 
The fact that the hegemony of hegemony is firmly in place in antiracism today 
means that racism cannot be adequately contested or, at least, identified and 
known in academic theory and analyses. The way that actually existing 
antiracist social movements engage in strategic flexibility is sidelined in favor of 
developing “theoretical clarity about racial dynamics” (Omi and Winant 1986, 
102). As long as antiracists continue to theorize only from the perspective of 
differentialist or universalist strategy, mischaracterizations will be reproduced in 
antiracism. Such mischaracterizations manifest themselves, for example, in a 
tendency to denounce colourblindness in the United States. The focus for the 
majority of contemporary American theorists of antiracism seems to be on 
resisting what they identify as colourblind or post-racial perspectives. To draw on 
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “this new ideology has become a formidable political tool 
for the maintenance of the racial order. Much as Jim Crow racism served as the 
glue for defending a brutal and overt system of racial oppression in the pre-Civil 
Rights era, color-blind racism serves today as the ideological armor for a covert 
and institutionalized system in the post-Civil Rights era” (2006, 3). What Bonilla-
Silva misses, however, is that both racist and antiracist discourses can make use 
of colorblindness even in the post-Civil Rights era. By directing our attention 
solely to colourblind or universalist forms of racism, as American sociology and 
antiracist theory is wont to do, we lose sight of the complex ways in which racism 
manifests itself also according to colourconscious strategies, and, equally, how 
our own antiracism also maintains, and relies on, certain racial myths. The 
temptation to relegate to the past certain ideologies and strategies of racism, 
on the basis that these belonged more securely to another era, fails us as such 
an approach cannot take into account the discontinuities, accidents, and cul-
de-sacs of history. A hegemony of hegemony in antiracism, as such, prevents us 
from considering that it is not a matter of wishing away or using racial identity 
but, as anarchist antiracist movements show us, of knowing when to use identity 
in an adequately antiracist way and when to abandon it.  
 
Rather than seeking a coherent antiracist whole, we would do less violence to 
antiracism if we approached social movements in their already existing 
complexity. We need to learn to see that by being flexible and employing 
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“counterposed strategic orientations,” antiracist anarchists are, in fact, 
extending the front against racism, and they are doing so precisely by avoiding 
counter-hegemonic unity. It seems we are, as such, not in need of a unified 
antiracist theory; what we do need is a lot more of what we already have – that 
is, non-unified, decentralized, leaderless movements that bypass the need for a 
single response or a single strategy against racism. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Jakub Burkowicz is a PhD Candidate (ABD) in Sociology at Simon Fraser 
University. He is currently completing his dissertation entitled: “Peripheral 
Europeans: The History of the (De)Racialization of Slavs in Canada.” Burkowicz’s 
research and teaching interests include sociological theory; sociology of 
knowledge; sociology of race focusing on racialization and the history of Slavic 
immigration in Canada; and social movements with emphases on anarchist and 
antiracist approaches. 
2 Day’s witty coinage of “hegemony of hegemony” denotes hegemony 
becoming hegemonic. The phrase must be read in the twofold sense of a 
preference for the large scale revolutionary transformation of the entire social 
order that has itself become large scale within social movement theory.  
3 The injunction becomes explicit in Floya Anthias and Cathie Lloyd’s, Rethinking 
Anti-racisms: From theory to practice. Its aim, the editors tell us, is “to consider 
new ways of thinking about anti-racism and how they impact on anti-racist 
political practice” (2002, 1). 
4 The debt is acknowledged openly: “In our view, the concept of hegemony, 
through which the dominant social forces acquire the consent of the 
subordinate ones, in itself presumes and autonomous civil society and a limited 
capacity for state ‘intervention’ into the realm of ‘micro-politics,’ since this 
‘consent’ is not given stupidly or blindly but because the needs, interests and 
ideas of the subordinate groups are actively incorporated and taken into 
account in the organization of society” (Omi and Winant 1991, 170 n.22).   
5 It is for this reason that we may prefer to characterize the antiracism of Omi 
and Winant as “Gramscian influenced” as opposed to “Gramscian.” 
6 As we shall see, Omi and Winant also identify only a particular type of racism 
as the central antagonism. We may deduce that a vanguard is needed to not 
only identify the centre (racism) of their political universe but to also specify its 
nature.  
7 Systemic, or institutional, racism is a kind of racism that takes place in institutions 
(police departments, colleges and universities, places of employment, etc.) 
that, while appearing to be inclusive and equal, end ups privileging and 
preserving the interests of the dominant group. Systemic racism has the distinct 
quality of not looking like racism at first sight. In fact, it works better if those who 
practice it are not even aware of their role in it. Consider, for example, the 
current Canadian debate concerning the Parti Québécois’ proposed Charter of 
Quebec Values. In the alleged interest of secularism, the Charter would ban civil 
servants and public employees from displaying “ostentatious” religious symbols 
while on the job. To familiarize us with their plan, the party produced a helpful 
poster that includes illustrations of prohibited expressions of faith. In the interest 
of being fair, they have included in the poster, along the veiled Muslim woman 
and Turban-wearing Sikh man, a picture of a chest bearing a large Christian 
crucifix. On the surface, the Charter seems to fairly target all major religious 
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groups while its systemic racism is obvious when we consider that the ban would 
not actually affect Christians (other than, of course, Christian monks who 
actually do wear large crucifixes but who are not likely to apply for jobs in the 
public sector), but it would adversely affect Muslims and Sikhs. Again, there is 
nothing blatantly racist about this, and this is the point: systemic racism works 
best when the employees and party members who institute it are not 
committed racists but are simply interested in fairly applying the rules to all. 
8 Spivak develops one of the most well-known accounts of the progressive 
essential uses of identity. She argues in favor of what she calls strategic 
essentialism that pertains to “[t]he strategic use of an essence as a mobilizing 
slogan or a masterword like woman or worker or the name of a nation” (Spivak 
1993, 3, emphasis in original). Given that she understands that strategic 
essentialism is only an elaboration of a strategy that is not “good for all cases” 
(Spivak 1993, 4), I do not place her – despite the fact that she explicitly orients 
herself in terms of Gramscian hegemony – as a hegemonic proponent of 
differentialist antiracism. She is, to be sure, under the sway of the hegemony of 
hegemony, but her nuanced account of strategy falls under my notion of 
strategic flexibility. Perhaps with Spivak my own argument encounters a limit, or 
perhaps it is the case that we already have in Spivak a less-than-fully realized 
contestation of Gramscian hegemony. The fact that she “believe[s] in 
undermining the vanguardism of theory” (Spivak 1993, 15) certainly should give 
us cause to consider the latter possibility.  
9 I am deliberately misreading May here who speaks of strategy only in terms of 
strategic political philosophy, which unlike me, he does not attribute to 
theoretical traditions that he defines in terms of tactical political philosophy and 
formal political philosophy (1994). To be clear, I accept May’s definition of 
strategy, but I reject his grouping of only certain traditions under this “strategic” 
heading. For an in-depth critique of May’s taxonomy, see Nathan Jun’s 
Anarchism and Political Modernity (2012).  
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